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THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGICAL WARFARE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Amos N. Guiora* 
 
Deciding a year in advance the theme of a law review symposium is, at best, a 
tricky proposition. The considerations are varied: what topic will be relevant to 
academics and policymakers, who should be invited as panelists, how will invited 
individuals mix and collaborate with each other, what issue will be of interest to 
the larger community, and what kind of contribution will the symposium and 
subsequent publications make to the issue chosen? In conjunction with the Utah 
Law Review Board and faculty colleagues, we decided that addressing the legal 
and ethical aspects of technological warfare met the criteria we outlined for 
ourselves: it is an issue of enormous public interest, significant scholars would 
facilitate extraordinary discussion, and we would be able to impact the public 
debate. The remaining question was whether the issue would be “hot” at 
conference time. 
Hot it was, and hotter it became less than a week after the symposium. A mere 
five days after the conference was held, the Department of Justice released a White 
Paper1 regarding the Obama administration’s drone policy. Had the White Paper 
been released days before the conference, our timing would have been beyond 
extraordinary; perhaps remarkably prescient is a more appropriate term. Whether 
or not we anticipated the unknown is left to others to address; what is clear is that 
our distinguished panelists addressed the essence of the White Paper prior to its 
release. 
Did some of our panelists have knowledge as to its existence? Regardless of 
the answer to that rhetorical question, the reality is that the very issues that have 
caused widespread concern regarding the paper were the focal point of our 
discussion; particularly the two-hour scenario-based roundtable discussion. Had 
* © 2013 Professor Amos Guiora. Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College 
of Law. My colleagues, Professor Tony Anghie and Professor Wayne McCormack, whose 
graciousness and generosity of spirit define them, were reflective and thoughtful as panel 
moderators while ensuring, with enormous charm, that we stayed on schedule throughout 
the day. A special word of thanks to Clark Collings (J.D., May 2013), the Symposium 
Editor of the Utah Law Review; Clark was my partner in every sense of the word this past 
year and his unstinting efforts were essential to the symposium’s success. A very loud 
“shout out” is in order to Miriam Lovin, the remarkably efficient and overwhelmingly 
competent Events Director; Lynette Saccomanno, who handles travel arrangements with 
uncommon aplomb; Barry Scholl, the Director of External Relations; Dana Wilson, the 
Director of Marketing; and Mark Beekhuizen, the Director of the IT team, for their terrific 
efforts to bring the symposium to the public’s attention. 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST 
A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED 
FORCE (2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_D 
OJ_White_Paper.pdf. 
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the White Paper authors (unsigned) heard the discussion, it is not beyond the realm 
of the possible that second thoughts—if not much doubt—regarding the legal, 
moral, and practical paradigm would have been their response. The White Paper 
 
sets forth a legal framework for considering the circumstances in which 
the U.S. government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside 
the area of active hostilities against a U.S. citizen who is a senior 
operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force of al-Qa’ida—that 
is, an al-Qa’ida leader actively engaged in planning operations to kill 
Americans.2 
 
According to the White Paper, 
 
[T]he United States would be able to use lethal force against a U.S. 
citizen, who is located outside the United States and is an operational 
leader continually planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in 
at least the following circumstances: (1) where an informed, high-level 
official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted 
individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United 
States; (2) where a capture operation would be infeasible—and where 
those conducting the operation continue to monitor whether capture 
becomes feasible; and (3) where such an operation would be conducted 
consistent with applicable law of war principles.3 
 
However, the White Paper dramatically broadens the definition of legitimate 
target: “[T]he condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of 
violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have 
clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in 
the immediate future.”4 
History, tragically, shows that when a “legitimate” target is broadly defined, 
significant collateral damage is, largely, inevitable. Needless to say, the dangers 
emanating from the White Paper raise deeply disturbing questions regarding the 
policy’s legality and morality. There is an additional concern that must be 
addressed: the White Paper has created a significant dilemma for commanders and 
decision-makers that place them in an extraordinarily complicated paradigm. 
By comparison: when writing my book Constitutional Limits of Coercive 
Interrogation,5 I met with U.S. interrogators based in Iraq; their most powerful 
request was that guidelines and criteria for the limits of interrogation be clearly 
articulated in detailed written instructions. Their “demand” was predicated on a 
2 Id. at 1. 
3 Id. at 6. 
4 Id. at 7. 
5 AMOS N. GUIORA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON COERCIVE INTERROGATION (2008). 
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deeply held conviction (with which I agreed) that the Bybee Memo6 established a 
paradigm best described as “by all means necessary.” Their concern was that 
superiors would demand application of interrogation measures in violation of 
domestic and international law. Rearticulated: experienced interrogators were 
convinced superiors, in accordance with the Bybee Memo, would demand they 
violate the law. By analogy, it is troubling, albeit reasonable, to presuppose the 
White Paper will result in actions that violate domestic and international law. But 
not because commanders are inherently prone to nor particularly relish in 
committing crimes, not in the least. 
The panel discussions and roundtable highlighted the enormous complexity of 
technological warfare; whether by design or force of nature, the conversations 
focused quickly on the ethical aspects of U.S. drone policy. Perhaps that focus 
resulted from the unique mix of subject matter experts; perhaps it reflects the 
enormous ethical dilemmas posed by technological warfare, as compared to more 
traditional conflict. Whatever the cause, this emphasis is particularly noteworthy 
for it suggests recognition that while drones are legal there is greater concern, if 
not active questioning, about their morality. It is possible, however, that were the 
conference held after release of the DOJ White Paper, discussion would have 
largely focused on legal questions, in particular definitions of “imminence,” 
“senior operational leader,” and “al-Qa’ida. 
This unique mix reflected our conscious effort to address the issue of 
technological warfare from distinct perspectives: the law, philosophy, intelligence 
gathering and analysis, operational decision-making, and policy ramifications and 
implications. To do so would require not only an eclectic group of panelists—
stretching far beyond the traditional academic conference model of inviting 
recognized experts—but also their individual and collective willingness to directly 
engage and challenge each other. In contrast to “set piece” gatherings where 
panelists deliver stock comments, we felt a roundtable discussion, requiring 
addressing distinct scenarios relevant to technological warfare, would significantly 
enhance the discussion. 
The depth of the panel discussions, the extraordinary engagement amongst the 
panelists during a unique two-hour scenario-based roundtable discussion, and the 
extent of audience (including remote) engagement and participation unequivocally 
suggest the symposium clearly passed the high bar we set. One of the most 
important decisions we made was to invite a limited number of recognized subject-
matter experts from a wide range of fields—academic and nonacademic alike. Our 
panelists included extremely thoughtful and deeply knowledgeable professors of 
law and philosophy (from the United States and Canada), two retired U.S. flag 
officers (lieutenant general and brigadier general) who served with great 
6 See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN 
RIZZO ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: 
INTERROGATION OF AL QAEDA OPERATIVE (2002), available at http://media.luxmedia.com/
aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf. 
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distinction in the intelligence community, and a highly recognized policy expert 
(who graduated from the U.S. Military Academy). 
Our keynote speaker was Professor Trevor Morrison—who at the time was a 
Professor at Columbia University School of Law but is now Dean of New York 
University School of Law—and panelists included Professor Laurie Blank, Emory 
University Law School; James Carafano, the Heritage Foundation (Washington, 
D.C.); Professor Geoff Corn, South Texas School of Law; Professor Claire 
Finkelstein, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Department of 
Philosophy; Professor Monica Hakimi, University of Michigan Law School; 
Brigadier General (Ret.) David Irvine, Former Deputy Commander for the 96th 
Regional Readiness Command; Professor George R. Lucas, Professor of Ethics 
and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School; Professor Frederic Mégret, Faculty 
of Law, McGill University; and Lieutenant General (Ret.), Harry Soyster, former 
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. These participants were, in a word, 
outstanding, both in their panel presentation/discussion and in the remarkable 
exchanges that occurred in the round table. 
Professor Morrison’s thoughtful keynote address provided an important 
theoretical basis for the conference. By articulating legal architecture relevant to 
the articulation and implementation of the Obama administration’s drone policy in 
the context of executive power, Professor Morrison set the stage for subsequent 
discussion and disagreement. The interplay between academic voices and those of 
retired flag officers was fascinating to observe; the latter focusing on the human 
cost to soldiers and innocent civilians alike while the former engaged in addressing 
the legal, moral, and policy aspects of implementing such a policy. The 
extraordinary engagement and dialogue between the two distinct worlds was 
fascinating, as it highlighted the range of issues inherent to a thoughtful discussion 
regarding drones. 
The panels touched upon an extraordinary number of discussion points, 
perhaps reflecting powerfully disparate backgrounds and professional experiences. 
To highlight a few: the role of judicial review regarding both the drone policy and 
its implementation 7 ; whether drone policy should be subject to transparency 
requirements regarding criteria and guidelines8; the “human cost” of weapons from 
the perspective of the “trigger-puller”9; the limits of executive power; defining 
effectiveness in the decision-making process; the importance of recognizing the 
history of warfare (particularly in understanding the changing nature of conflict); 
understanding the impact of technology on the law (the reference was made, in 
7 To that end, recent public discussion has suggested creation of a “drone court.” Neal 
K. Katyal, Op-Ed., Who Will Mind the Drones?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at A27, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/opinion/an-executive-branch-drone-court
.html?_r=1&; Amos Guiora, Op-Ed, Drone Policy: A Proposal Moving Forward, JURIST 
(Mar. 4, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/03/amos-guiora-drone-policy.php. 
8  See Anwar Al-Awlaki—FOIA Request, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/anwar-al-awlaki-foia-request (last visited June 10, 2013). 
9 See generally JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, PLATOON LEADER: A MEMOIR OF COMMAND 
IN COMBAT 233 (1985). 
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particular, regarding surveillance technology); defining (whether narrowly or 
broadly is an important point of distinction) direct participant and degree of threat 
an individual poses in determining when force can be used and its limits10; the 
moral consequences of drone warfare; the extent of “tolerable” collateral damage; 
the requirement to define (whether narrowly or broadly is again an important point 
of distinction) the objective of the military operation (in the context of defining 
war and peace); how to define winning (predicated on a belief that winning is 
possible in asymmetrical warfare)11; the requirement, and difficulty, in gathering 
intelligence when “fighting amongst the people”; and whether managing terrorism 
is a legitimate objective; recognizing the importance of local culture and mores and 
the distinction between drones and “boots on the ground.” 
These issues and Professor Morrison’s keynote address provided an 
extraordinarily rich and vibrant basis for the roundtable discussion. Our objective 
with respect to the scenario-based roundtable was to facilitate engaged discussion 
amongst the panelists; the high-level discussion, marked by disagreement and 
agreement alike, reflects the complexity and controversy inherent to the drone 
policy. The active participation suggests both that scenario-based discussion 
engenders intense debate and dialogue and that the drone discussion is remarkably 
complicated, complex, and controversial. 
In addressing distinct scenarios, the panelists had to resolve questions about 
when implementing the drone policy would reflect respect for the laws of war and 
standards of morality and ethics. The scenarios were predicated on real-time 
decision-making; that is, the luxury of time and reflection was denied the 
participants. In resolving the legal and moral aspects of the drone policy, 
participants were forced to assess different scenarios including whether women 
and children are legitimate targets based on intelligence information provided by a 
source. While consensus was expressed regarding identification of women as 
legitimate targets, differences of opinion were articulated regarding children. The 
lack of unanimity was of particular importance because it suggested distinct 
categories of threats and permissible use of state power; furthermore, the impact on 
the decision-maker/trigger-puller with respect to engaging a child was repeatedly 
mentioned. 
Engaging a child may, perhaps, appear to be on the edge of tolerable 
operational counterterrorism; to that end, the discussion regarding children was 
particularly important because it forced panelists to confront the limits of self-
defense, morality, and the rule of law. While panelists expressed consensus 
regarding women as legitimate targets, no military, according to reliable sources, 
has conducted either a drone or targeted killing operation against women 
regardless of their involvement in terrorism. The lack of consensus regarding 
children mirrors actual operational decision-making, because militaries also have 
10 Needless to say, the Department of Justice White Paper is on point with respect to 
the definitional discussion. 
11 Charles J. Dunlap Jr., America’s Asymmetric Advantage, ARMED FORCES J. (Sept. 
2006), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013. 
 
                                                        
1220 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
 
not conducted drone or targeted killing operations against minors, in spite of their 
involvement in terrorism. 
In the aftermath of the DOJ White Paper, this discussion is particularly 
important in the context of defining “legitimate target” and circumstances that 
justify engaging that individual. Were the conference held after the White Paper’s 
release, the discussion would have focused on specific terms that have caused 
significant discomfort amongst academics and commentators. Needless to say, not 
all observers and pundits have expressed concern; those who have, focus on “the 
condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of violent attack 
against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence 
that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate 
future”12. The importance of this phrase is paramount, for it highlights the tension 
between the legitimacy of the drone policy and its limits. Rearticulated, the 
fundamental question is how to define and determine whether an individual poses 
an imminent threat. In other words, what is imminence? 
The legitimacy of the drone policy—legally and morally—demands 
resolution of this question. As the conference discussion made clear, however, 
determining the limits of state power also requires addressing the dilemmas 
inherent to warfare. That is, even though the trigger-puller is removed from the 
zone of combat, the moral quandary in determining whether a particular individual 
poses an imminent threat is not dissimilar to the moral quandary confronted by 
“boots on the ground.” To that extent, articulating a paradigm where “imminence” 
and “legitimate target” are broadly defined is not cost-free from the soldier’s 
perspective. This, frankly, is an issue that has largely flown under the proverbial 
radar: the widespread assumption is that “joy-stick operators” do not face moral 
dilemmas akin to commanders and soldiers who directly confront the enemy. 
Whether that is indeed an accurate representation of the dilemmas of the new 
conflict is a matter of conjecture and interpretation. What is beyond doubt, as 
reflected in the thoughtful comments during the symposium, is the need to address 
this question. That requirement takes on increased urgency in the aftermath of the 
White Paper that significantly broadens the range of legitimate targets thereby 
increasing, arguably, the moral dilemmas confronting decision-makers and trigger-
pullers alike. This is an issue—as made clear during the conference—that requires 
careful attention and additional research. 
Undoubtedly, the nature of conflict is undergoing significant changes; perhaps 
an exaggeration, but the transition from direct to remote engagement most 
dramatically describes this powerful transformation. To that end, the focus on the 
ethical dilemmas inherent to the drone policy that dominated much of the 
conference discussion anticipated the powerful and concerning questions raised in 
the aftermath of the White Paper. While participants were largely sanguine with 
respect to the legality of the policy (pre-release of the White Paper), that comfort 
zone was not articulated regarding the policy’s morality. The confluence between 
12 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 7. 
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ethical concerns raised by symposium participants and the broad definitions in the 
White Paper will become an important focal point regarding drone policy. 
One of the dominant, and admittedly controversial, issues we discussed in the 
conference is that states have an obligation to conduct themselves morally, 
including during armed conflict. Although some may find this notion inherently 
contradictory, “morality in armed conflict” is a term of art (and not an oxymoron) 
that lies at the core of the instant discussion. This concept imposes an absolute 
requirement that soldiers treat the civilian population of areas in which they are 
engaged in conflict with the utmost dignity and respect. This obligation holds true 
whether combat takes place house-to-house or using remotely piloted aircraft tens 
of thousands of feet up in the sky. This concept may be simple to articulate, yet it 
is difficult to implement; the operational reality of armed conflict short of war 
requires a soldier to make multiple decisions involving various factors, all of 
which have never-ending spin-off potential. After all, every decision is not only 
complicated in and of itself, but also each operational situation has a number of 
“forks.” The implication is that no decision is linear, and every decision leads to 
additional dilemmas and spurs further decision-making. 
Operational decision-making is thus predicated on a complicated triangle that 
must incorporate the rule of law, morality, and effectiveness. I have been asked 
repeatedly whether that triangle endangers soldiers while giving the other side an 
undue advantage. The concern is understandable; however, the essence of armed 
conflict is that innocent civilians are in the immediate vicinity of combatants and 
there is a duty to protect them even at the risk of harm to soldiers.13 The burden to 
distinguish between combatant and civilian is extraordinarily complicated and 
poses significant operational dilemmas for, and burdens on, soldiers. 
For armed conflict conducted in accordance with the rule of law and morality, 
this burden of distinction can never be viewed as mere mantra. Distinction,14 then, 
is integral to the discussion. It is as relevant and important to the soldier standing 
at a checkpoint, uncertain whether the person standing opposite him is a combatant 
or civilian, as it must be in any targeted killing dilemma. The decision whether to 
operationally engage must reflect a variety of criteria and guidelines.15 Otherwise, 
the nation state conducts itself in the spirit of a video game where victims are not 
real and represent mere numbers, regardless of the degree of threat they pose. 
At the most fundamental level, operational decision-making in the context of 
counterterrorism involves the decision whether to kill an individual defined as a 
legitimate target.16 Although some argue killing is inherently immoral, I argue that 
13 See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
14 See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 (declaring that the only 
legitimate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the 
military forces of the enemy). 
15  See Amos N. Guiora, Determining a Legitimate Target: The Dilemma of the 
Decisionmaker, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 315, 332–36 (2012). 
16 See id. at 336. 
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killing in the context of narrowly defined self-defense is both legal and moral 
provided that the decision to pull the trigger is made in the context of a highly 
circumscribed and criteria-based framework. If limits are not imposed in defining a 
legitimate target, then decisions take on the hue of both illegality and immorality. 
As the conference discussion highlighted, we are at a crossroads: traditional 
state war has morphed, by force of circumstances, into conflict between States and 
nonstate actors. Traditionally, international law sought to establish criteria and 
limits by which nation states fought wars against other States, although violations 
of the laws of war inevitably occurred.17  Nevertheless, the rules were clearly 
articulated and understood, although not always implemented or respected.18 The 
era of State versus nonstate conflict, in contrast, has been marked by both random 
and deliberate attacks against innocent civilians by nonstate actors.19 The State, in 
response, has been forced to develop and implement operational counterterrorism 
measures intended to protect the civilian population while striking at those 
responsible for the attacks. Such response has been legitimate and necessary. The 
primary obligation of the State is to protect its innocent civilian population and 
valuable national resources and assets.20 While this obligation is unambiguous, the 
question remains: How can a State meet these obligations? Should there be limits 
imposed regarding the use of force? And if so, what are those limits? 
The concern for a moral and legal basis in conflict and counterterrorism 
operations is not based on compassion for terrorists. Anyone who deliberately 
targets innocent men, women, and children is a legitimate target. 21  Decision-
making subject to moral and legal restraints, however, must go beyond an 
indiscriminate application of power that is devoid of articulated and narrowly 
applied criteria. Although collateral damage may well be inevitable to war and 
counterterrorism alike, it is nevertheless essential that States recognize their 
absolute obligation to proactively minimize the deaths of innocent individuals. 
The callous decision by nonstate actors to deliberately place their innocent 
civilians in harm’s way unduly impacts that burden. Human shielding is a clear 
violation of international law and reflects extraordinary disregard for the value of 
human life.22 As made clear during Operation Cast Lead (i.e., the Gaza War),23 
17 See, e.g., Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. 
18 See GUIORA, supra note 5, at 320. 
19 See generally U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006); see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Taimoor Shah, 
Differing Theories in Killing of 17 in Taliban Stronghold, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at 
A8 (discussing attacks on civilians by non-state actors). 
20 G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 19, at 2 (noting the threat nonstate actors can pose to 
state security through acts of terrorism). 
21 See Charli Carpenter, Fighting the Laws of War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 
146 (discussing the challenges posed by modern warfare, but concluding that traditional 
laws of war, including those that prohibit targeting innocent civilians, still apply). 
22 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian 
Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009). 
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terrorist organizations deliberately use their own civilians as human shields. 24 
However, that fact does not and must not justify targeted killing that results in 
undue collateral damage. The fact that terrorist organizations violate standards of 
law and morality must be universally condemned, but such conduct does not 
justify a paradigm in which collateral damage is tolerated. Ethical decision-
making, human judgment, a moral conscience, and the rule of law must all work 
together to ensure that Americans do not become the enemy we are fighting.25 
 
A.  Role of Modern Technology 
 
The use of drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”), has 
further complicated the relationship between counterterrorism, self-defense, and 
morality in armed conflict. Many argue that the combination of modern technology 
and sophisticated intelligence analysis all but ensures that UAV policy is the most 
effective contemporary means to conduct operational counterterrorism. 26  The 
argument sounds compelling and convincing: What is more attractive than killing 
terrorists from the air with the use of sleek technology while minimizing risk to 
ground forces? We are in an age where shiny technology and seemingly 
sophisticated intelligence gathering and analysis converge, potentially removing 
the human element, and humanity, from decision-making. 27  However, targeted 
killing is fraught with extraordinary risk. Computers and advanced technology are, 
undoubtedly, essential to intelligence gathering and other important aspects of 
counterterrorism and armed conflict; suggesting otherwise would be folly. But the 
trend toward relaxed or flexible definitions of imminence, legitimate targets, and 
proportionality means that such an increasing reliance on technology can 
exacerbate rather than curtail these dangers. 
Our focus on the legal, moral, and policy aspects of the drone policy was a 
direct reflection of the extraordinary subject matter experts who participated in the 
Utah Law Review symposium. The broad range of disciplines and experiences 
represented among the ten participants enabled candid, forthright, and insightful 
discourse. While consensus on substantive issues is nearly impossible, widespread 
23 See Israel Says Gaza Death Toll Lower than Claimed, CNN (Mar. 26, 2009, 1:08 
PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-26/world/israel.gaza.death.toll_1_israeli-military-pal
estinians-civilian-deaths?_s=PM:WORLD (discussing Operation Cast Lead). 
24 See Terrorists Use Palestinian Civilians as Human Shields (Info Live television 
broadcast Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_YP6AtdwJQ& 
feature=fvwrel; see also Cast Lead Video: Hamas Terrorist Uses Children as Human 
Shield (Israeli Def. Forces online video Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=2vHDyuSTneA. 
25 My gratitude to Margaret Hu for articulating this point so clearly for me. 
26 See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of 
War, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 675, 679, 701 (2011) (discussing the potential impact of 
unmanned drones on the law of armed conflicts). 
27 DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL 244 (2012) (reporting a top Obama 
administration official’s concern that new technology distracts from human realities). 
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agreement was sounded regarding the remarkable intellectual, academic, and 
practical benefit that results from dialogue amongst distinct, powerful voices. 
The U.S. drone policy raises profoundly important questions regarding the 
very nature of operational counterterrorism; its implementation reveals how 
morality and the rule of law are applied in an inherently ambiguous and amorphous 
paradigm. At present, the increasingly broader and more flexible definition of 
imminence, combined with a continually growing reliance on sleek new 
technology, is highly problematic and raises significant concerns about whether 
law and morality are truly serving as the necessary guiding force here. Law not 
only provides a State with the right to engage those who deliberately and randomly 
target innocent civilians, it also provides the essential guiding framework for the 
extent to which, and manner by which, the State can target and engage those 
individuals. 
Simply articulating an aggressive, tough-on-terrorism policy is not sufficient. 
Rather, the devil truly is in the details: the State must carefully define both the 
limits of force and how that limited force is to be applied. Such a carefully defined 
limit and application of force is the essence of both morality in armed conflict and 
the rule of law. In contrast, deliberately operating in an open-ended paradigm with 
opaque parameters where state power is broadly defined and implemented opens 
the door, unnecessarily, to significant violations of morality and law. 
Unlimited drone warfare where limits, targets, and goals are not narrowly 
defined creates an operational environment in which anyone killed, regardless of 
whether intended or unintended, is considered a legitimate target. This expanded 
articulation of “legitimate target,” premised on significant expansion of tolerable 
collateral damage, creates a slippery slope that inevitably results in the deaths of 
otherwise innocent individuals. The allure of modern technology has led many 
decision-makers to minimize the need to carefully distinguish between the 
individuals who pose a threat and those who do not. 
Decision-makers must not lose sight of the fact that targeted killing, on the 
basis of received and actionable intelligence information, is inherently 
problematic; it poses extraordinary operational challenges that must be resolved 
precisely because of targeted killing’s importance to lawful self-defense. It must be 
operationalized in the most careful, narrow, and specific manner possible—
meaning that a discriminating analysis of who is a legitimate target must be 
matched by equally discriminating analysis of who constitutes collateral damage, 
how much collateral damage is likely, and, most important, how much collateral 
damage is legally and morally acceptable or tolerable. 
Morality in armed conflict is not a mere mantra; it imposes significant 
demands on the nation state that it must adhere to limits and considerations beyond 
simply killing the other side. For better or worse, drone warfare of today will 
become the norm of tomorrow. Multiply the number of attacks conducted regularly 
in the present and you have the operational reality of future warfare. It is important 
to recall that drone policy is effective on two distinct levels: it takes the fight to 
terrorists directly involved, either in past or future attacks, and serves as a powerful 
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deterrent for those considering involvement in terrorist activity.28 Its importance 
and effectiveness, however, must not hinder critical conversation, particularly with 
respect to defining “imminence” and “legitimate target.” The overly broad 
definition, “flexible” in the Obama administration’s words, 29  raises profound 
concerns regarding how imminence is applied. That concern is concrete for the 
practical import of Brennan’s phrasing is a dramatic broadening of the definition of 
“legitimate target.” It is also important to recall that operators—military, CIA, or 
private contractors—are responsible for implementing executive branch guidelines 
and directives.30 For that very reason, the approach Brennan articulated on behalf 
of the administration is troubling. 
This approach, while theoretically appealing, fails on a number of levels. 
First, it undermines and does a profound injustice to the military and security 
personnel tasked with operationalizing defense of the State, particularly 
commanders and officers. When senior leadership deliberately obfuscates policy to 
create wiggle room and plausible deniability, junior commanders (those at the tip 
of the spear, in essence) have no framework to guide their operational choices.31 
The results can be disastrous, as the example of Abu Ghraib shows all too well.32 
Second, it gravely endangers the civilian population. What is done in the 
collective American name poses danger both to our safety because of the 
possibility of blow-back attacks in response to a drone attack that caused 
significant collateral damage, and to our values because the policy is loosely 
articulated and problematically implemented.33 
Third, the approach completely undermines our commitment to law and 
morality that defines a nation predicated on the rule of law. If everyone who 
constitutes “them” is automatically a legitimate target, then careful analysis of 
threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, reliability, and other factors 
becomes meaningless. Self-defense becomes a mantra that justifies all action, 
regardless of method or procedure. 
28 See Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 107–09 (2010) (explaining the geographic expansiveness of drone 
policy and its use to prevent future attacks). 
29 John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, 
Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brenn
an-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an. 
30 See HUMAN RIGHTS INST. COLUMBIA LAW SCH., TARGETING OPERATIONS WITH 
DRONE TECHNOLOGY: HUMANITARIAN LAW IMPLICATIONS 25 (Background Note for the 
Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law Annual Meeting, 2011). 
31 See Amos N. Guiora & Martha Minow, National Objectives in the Hands of Junior 
Leaders, in COUNTERING TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 179, 184–85 
(James J.F. Forest ed., 2007). 
32 See id. at 184. 
33 See id. (discussing the illustrative “black flag” incident in which fifty-six innocent 
Israeli civilians were killed after junior leaders mistakenly interpreted a commanding 
officer’s comment that God should have mercy on any villager out after curfew to be a 
command to shoot anyone returning from the fields after curfew). 
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Accordingly, the increasing reliance on modern technology must raise a 
warning flag. Drone warfare is conducted using modern technology with the 
explicit assumption that the technology of the future is more sophisticated, more 
complex, and more lethal. Its sophistication and complexity, however, must not be 
viewed as a holy grail. While armed conflict involves the killing of individuals, the 
relevant questions must remain whom, why, how, and when. Seductive methods 
must not lead us to reflexively conclude that we can charge ahead. Indeed, the 
more sophisticated the mechanism, the more questions we must ask. Capability 
cannot substitute for process, and technology cannot substitute for analysis. 
 
